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EMPLOYEE CHOICE AND SOME PROBLEMS OF RACE
AND REMEDIES IN REPRESENTATION CAMPAIGNS
THE National Labor Relations Board in its zeal to ensure a reasoned choice
by employees in representation elections has created a distinction between
emotional and rational campaign propaganda on the subject of race. While a
closer consideration of the requirements of a free choice suggests that this
distinction is not a tenable one, other remedies, not used to date by the Board,
seem appropriate in ensuring both a free and reasoned choice in representation
elections generally. This Note will address itself to both of these problems.
RACE AND REASONED CHOICE IN REPRESENTATION CAMPAIGNS
A union conducts a representation campaign in a southern, non-unionized
plant; the employer, seeking to persuade his employees to reject the union, at-
tacks the union as favoring and pursuing a policy of racial integration.1 Such
attacks on union racial policy, whether blatant or in more subtle forms, have
been pressed vigorously in Southern locales 2 and thus have posed a significant
obstacle to unionization in the South.3 Though the general failure of organiza-
1. Altering the question that the employees regard as having been put to them will
alter their response. For example, it is a principle of public controversy that "the party
which is able to make its definition of the issues prevail is likely to take over the govern-
ment... The substitution of conflicts is the most devastating kind of political strategy."
SCIIATTSCHNEIDER, SEM SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 74, 76 (1960). On the uses of the substitution
strategy see also ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 410-23 (1954).
2. Attempts to show that unions will favor Negroes are made before nearly every
representation election conducted by the NLRB in the South, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1957,
p. 57, col. 2. See also H. R. REP. No. 75142, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1961).
In light of the scarcity of authoritative information on the use of the race issue the Yale
Law Journal attempted to survey unions and civil rights organizations active in the South.
The president of the North Carolina State AFL-CIO wrote that "95% of the employers in
the South raise the racial issue in ... organizing campaigns." Letter from NV. 11. Barbee
to the Yale Law Journal, February 17, 1963, on file in Yale Law Library. The Public Re-
lations Director of the South Carolina Labor Council, noting that "exact figures are not
available," wrote that "the equal opportunity policies and practices of organized labor are
very often raised by the employer." Letter from Clarence T. Easterling to the Yale Law
Journal, February 21, 1963, on file in Yale Law Library.
3. See Troy, The Growth of Union Membersip in the South, 1939-1953, 24 S. Eco. J.
407 (1958). The employer's use of the race issue has been credited with the cancellation of
some organizational drives, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1957, p. 57, col. 2, and the general failure
of all organizational efforts in the South, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1957, p. 38, col. 2. See
generally Mrus & BRowN, FROm WAGNER Acr TO TAEI-HAnLzF 125-28 (1950) and
Wyle, Union Organization Activity under Taft-Hartlc3y 11 N.Y.U. Co.MrzWnz.-cE On
L.4moR 191, 205-10 (1958). But see Marshall, Somne Factors Influencing the Growth of
Unions in the South, 13 INDUSTRIAL RELATIoNs RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, PR0CtEEINGS 166
(1960) (hereinafter IRRA, PROCEEDINGS).
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tional efforts 4 is undoubtedly a result of a complex of factors, including hostile
local laws,5 widespread community and employer antagonism, the unfamiliarity
of employees with organized activity, 7 a general labor surplus,
8 and rising wages
4. Recent history suggests that the problem of Southern union organization is similar
to that faced by unions across the country before 1933, Barkin, Organization of the Un-
organized, 9 IRRA, PROCEEDINGS 232 (1956). See also MInus & BROWN, Op. Cit. supra note
3, at 126.
While there has been considerable industrial growth in the South and union organization
efforts there have been intensive, the growth of unions has been negligible. Leaders of the
New South have long since urged that the region's salvation lies in industrialization; every
Southern state now has a program to attract industry. Marshall, sapra note 3, at 180. Be-
tween 1939 and 1952 the Southern states were among the leaders in the growth of in-
dustrial employment, Wolfbein, The Changing Geography of American Industry, 6 IRRA,
PROCEEDINGS 202, 203 (1953). See also Van Sickle, Industrialization and the Soutlh, 15 S.
Eco. J. 412 (1949), and for a still earlier but classic study, see BERGLUND, STARNES AND
DE VyvFR, LABOR IN THE INDUSTRIAL SOUTH 10 (1930). In the immediate postwar era the
CIO undertook "Operation Dixie". Since then many unions have applied themselves as-
siduously and generously to organizing the South. Barkin, supra. For estimates of ex-
penditures and effort see Marshall, supra at 166, n.1. Union efforts have not been notably
successful; 17% of the union potential is presently organized in the South Atlantic states,
18% in the South Central states as compared with 42% in the East North Central and
46% in the Pacific states. Brown, Organization of the Unorganized, 9 IRRA, PROcEEDixOs
230 (1956). For a table of comparative union membership see de Vyver, Labor Factors in
the Industrial Development of the South) 18 S. Eco. J. 189, 194 (1951). The most complete
study is Troy, supra note 3, at 407.
Part of the failure of union efforts in the South is due to the internal problems of the
unions, ie., jurisdictional disputes and the unavailability of funds to meet the high cost of
organization in the geographically diffuse Southern industry. Barkin, supra.
5. Notably right to work laws; Barkin, The Decline of the Trade Union Movement
and What Can Be Done About It, 1961 CENTER FOR THE STUDY Or DEMOCRATIC INSTITU-
TIONS 30 (1961).
6. Employers have made a public regional cause of keeping unions out. They have used
economic power to destroy the union's following, to discriminate against union leaders,
sympathizers and members, and to close mills where the union has gotten a foothold. Local
community forces have been marshaled in anti-union campaigns. MILLIS & BROWN, Op.
cit. .uipra note 3, at 125-28. See also Marshall, supra note 3, at 174, 176.
"Community hostility to unions in the South is due not only to a natural antipathy
for the upsetting influence of a new power center, but also to the effects most Southern
leaders think unions have on industrial development."
Marshall, supra note 3, at 180. See also BARIN, THE PERSONALITY PROFILE Or SOUTHERN
TExTILE WORKCERS ( ). But cf. de Vyver, supra note 4, at 195.
7. Southern laborers are individually oriented and have been reared in agricultural
rural societies with little experience with participation in social or collective organiza-
tion. They have lived in small towns usually isolated and culturally unrelated to metro-
politan areas . . . they have little personal knowledge of the forms or methods of
self-organization and the potential gains to be obtained from workers' unions.
Barkin, New Labor Relations Policies and Remedies Suggested by Different Industrial
Settings, 15 IRRA, PROCEEDINGS (1962) (to be published). Thus the workers are susceptible
to the familiar myths, if myths they be, of local dependence on the employer and the plight
of Southern industry, and to the dominant parochialism and prevailing attitudes on race.
Barkin, Organization of the Unorganized, supra note 4, at 233. See also Marshall, supra
note 3, at 174.
8. There are a million more workers on Southern farms than are needed, Robock and
Peterson, Fact and Fiction About Southern Labor, 32 H.A&v. Bus. REv. 79, 81 (1954), and
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in the absence of unionism,9 the fear of "undesirable" union racial policies 10
is recognized as a dominant barrier to union success." Two recent decisions 2
of the NLRB have sought to fashion criteria for determining when such racial
appeals will require invalidation of the results of an election.' 9 In setting aside
a union defeat in one election and declining to do so in another, the Board
stated that its test was whether the employer's propaganda created an atmos-
phere in which "the uninhibited desires of the employees can not be deter-
mined." 14 The Board upheld the employer's racial appeal in Allen-Morrison
Sign Co., deeming it "temperate in tone,... germane, and... factual" ;15 in
Sewell Mfg. Co. it found the employer's propaganda so "inflammatory" as to
make "a reasoned basis for choosing a bargaining representative" impossible.'0
At one time there was little doubt that one of the NLRB's principal func-
tions was the encouragement and promotion of union organization. 17 The Taft-
Hartley Act, designed to restore a balance between labor and management,' 8
however, expressly guaranteed to employees the "right to refrain" from col-
lective bargaining 19 and to employers the right freely to address their em-
low wage, labor intensive, competitive industry comprises a greater part of industry in the
South than elsewhere. S. REP. No. 2830,84th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1956).
9. Barkin, Organization of the Unorgani-ced, mpra note 4, at 175.
10. Fr a discussion of union policies on racial matters see Marshall, stpra note 3, at
180. See also Fleischman, Labor and the Civil Rights Revolution, 43 THE NEVW LEADE 16
(1960).
There is some disagreement about the effect of unionization on the Negro. Dewey as-
serts that a successful organizational drive would end Negro prospects in Southern manu-
facturing for many years. Dewey, Negro Employment in Southern Industry, 60 J. PoL.
EcoN. 279 (1952). Ruchames cites the growth of industrial unions in the South as a factor
favoring equality of opportunity there. RUCHAm E, RAcE, JOBS AND PorrMcs 191 (1953).
There was a time when Negro leadership believed that the Negro's main hope was in
"solidarity with labor:' MmnAI., AN AMERICAN DmrarM 788 (1944).
11. Cf. authorities cited note 3 supra.
12. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (1962). 50 L.R.R.M. 1532 (1962) ; and
Allen-Morrison Sign Co., Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. No. 11 (1962), 50 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1962).
13. Ordering a new election is the exclusive remedy employed by the Board in repre-
sentation cases, except where the offensive conduct found to be coercive and the evidence for
the finding is either non-speech conduct or speech amounting to a threat or a promise, cf.
text accompanying notes 88-93 infra.
14. Sewell Mfg. Co., 50 L.R.tRl. at 1534.
15. Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 50 L.R.RPM. at 1535, 1536.
16. Sewell Mfg. Co., 50 L.R.M. at 1534.
17. The governing declaration of policy reads in the Taft-Hartley Act as it did in the
Wagner Act:
It is [the] declared ... policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce... by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining...
49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958). But the force of this declaration vms sub-
stantially greater before the Taft-Hartley amendments. For an indication of how seriously
the Wagner Act Board took its duty to affirmatively encourage union organization, see Cox,
Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 3-4
(1947). See also Mr.s & BRowN, op. cit. mpra note 3, at 3.
18. Cox, supra note 17, at 44.
19. 61 Stat. 140 (1947),29U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
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ployees so long as their speech does not include threats or promises.20 Since
Taft-Hartley the Board's role has apparently become that of a disinterested
umpire of the contest between labor and management for the workers' votes," '
its statutory charge being no longer the union, but the employee. 22 Thus, while
the Wagner Act Board held employers to strict neutrality in representation
campaigns, 23 the employer is now allowed, 24 indeed encouraged, 25 to present
the case against unionism in order that the employee, in making his choice,
may have the benefit of the views and information of all parties to the elec-
tion.26 The fact that a given employer practice tends to inhibit union organiza-
tion is not a sufficient ground for Board intervention in a representation cam-
paign.
27
This increased concern for the conditions under which an employee exercises
his choice is reflected in the Board's formulation and development of the
"laboratory" concept, which was first announced in General Shoe Corp.,2 8 a
case decided shortly after Taft-Hartley. In that case the Board found that
interrogation of employees in their homes and in the employer's office prior to
an election interfered with the employees' "free" choice and thus warranted
ordering a new election.2 9 The Board stated that its function was "to provide
a laboratory where, under as nearly ideal conditions as possible, the unin-
20. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1958). These amendments and the new
section 8 provisions subjecting the organizational activities of labor unions to restrictions
similar to those imposed on the activities of the employer, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
158(b) (1958), support the conclusion that the Taft-Hartley Act represents an abandon-
ment of the policy of affirmatively encouraging the spread of collective bargaining.
21. See Cox, supra note 17, at 44, 274; Mn~us & BRoWNr, op. cit. siupra note 3, at 655;
and Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR Pouicy 39 (1960).
22. See Cox, supra note 17, at 47, and Miams & BROWN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 665.
If the Landrum-Griffin Act can be said to have had any effect on these matters, it is surely
one of reinforcing the concern for the employees. 73 Stat. 519 (1959) ; 29 U.S.C.A. § 401
(Supp. 1962).
23. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 14 N.L.R.B. 346 (1939), enforced as amended, 114
F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 689 (1941). See also 12 NLRB ANN. REI .
17 (1947).
24. See, e.g., Charroin Mfg. Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 38, 40 (1950). See also 16 NLRB ANN.
REP. 132-33 (1951).
25. See, e.g., NuTone, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1955), modified, 243 F.2d 593 (1957),
rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 357 (1958). See generally MILUiS & BROWN, op. Cit. supra
note 3, at 526.
26. See Cox, supra note 17, at 15. For a discussion of the Board's varying attitudes
toward employer speech, see Wirtz, The New National Labor Relations Board, Herein of
"Employer Persuasion," 49 Nw. U. L. Rxv. 594 (1954) ; Sinsheimer, Employer Free Speech,
A Comparative Analysis, 14 U. Cni. L. Rxv. 617 (1947).
27. This fact, secured by the Taft-Hartley Act, had been accepted by the late Wagner
Act Board. See MILis & BROWN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 178-89.
28. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). The considerations finally made explicit here as the
laboratory test had been developing through many cases. See, e.g., P. D. Gwaltney, Jr. and
Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 371 (1947); Maywood Hosiery Mills, Inc., 64 N.L.R.B. 146 (1945).
29. 77 N.L.R.B. at 127.
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hibited desires of employees can be determined."30 Under the laboratory stand-
ard the Board has invalidated elections where it found that the employees have
been threatened, pressured or intimidated 3 1 or that material facts peculiarly
within a party's knowledge have been misrepresented by that party.32 It is
perhaps just a lag in articulation, rendered innocuous by the fact that the
Board has long addressed a host of considerations other than absence of
coercion under the guise of protecting a "free choice,"a' that only now in
Sewell has a concern for "reasoned choice" been explicitly noted. Here the
laboratory concept was articulated as a standard designed to insure that em-
ployees were free "from all elements which prevent or impede a reasoned
choice."m
An evaluation of the laboratory concept, especially as applied to the injec-
tion of the race issue into organizational campaigns, requires a closer examina-
tion of what it is meant to ensure-a reasoned choice. A choice is deemed ra-
tional or reasoned, if given the goal of the actor, however acquired, and the in-
formation before him, he selects that alternative which is most consistent with
his goal.35 The following model, while not intended to suggest the precision of
mathematics, should provide a valuable tool for examining the elements of ra-
tionality.36 Choosing a union has positive and negative consequences for the
employee. An employee's expectations on wages, job security, fellowship,
employer attitude, and racial relationships will often be among the principal
positive and negative components of the employee's decision to vote for or
against a union.37 The ultimate decision will be a function of the value he as-
signs to each component and the likelihood he attaches to the occurrence of
30. Ibid.
31. See, e.g., Shovel Supply Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1485 (1958).
32. See, e.g., United States Gypsum Co., 130 N.L.1RB. 901 (1961).
33. In General Shoe Corp., the Board had characterized the employer's conduct as "far
beyond the presently accepted custom of campaigns directed at employees' reasoning facul-
ties." 77 N.L.R.B. at 127. In the series of misrepresentation cases the Board has been con-
cerned with the ability to "evaluate propaganda." See, e.g., United Aircraft Corp., 103
N.L.R1B. 102 (1953). The Board has also promulgated a series of rules designed to insure
calm and order at the polling place. See, e.g., New York Shipping Ass'n, 103 N.L.R.B.
137 (1954). The Board has attended to these various considerations under the rubric of
"free choice."
34. Sewell Mfg. Co., 50 L.R.RM. at 1534.
35. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AN-D Ecoxoauc ORGANIZATION, 16, 92 (1947).
See also DAHL & LINDBLOM, POLITICS, Ecoxomcs AND WELFARE 38 (1953); SIMon,
ADmNISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 61-78 (2d ed. 1957) ; Freund, Rationality in Judicial Decisions,
paper delivered at 1963 annual meeting of the American Society for Political and Legal
Philosophy and to be published in FRaRIcH (ed.), Nomos V (1963).
36. Compare Hempel, Rational Action, in PROCEEDINaS AND ADDRESSES OF THE A1mR-
CAN PH.osoPHicAL ASSOCATION 9 (1962).
37. "The society and respect of other people" and "creature comforts and economic
security" are significant considerations impelling a worker to join a union. Bakke, Why
Workers Join Unions, in SHISTER, READINGS IN LABOR EcoNomIcs AND INDUSTRIAL RE-
LATioNS 30 (2d ed. 1956).
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each.38 The following chart is an example of one possible set of values and
probabilities.
COMPONENTS WAGES JOB FELLOWSHIP EMPLOYER RACIAL
SECURITY ATTITUDE RELATIONSIIIP
utility +80 +40 +10 -20 -60
probability (.8) (.5) (.5) (.5) (.8)
expected
utility of
each component 64 20 5 -10 -48
total expected
utility +31
Given an employee's belief that the above consequences would flow from union-
ization and the indicated values he attributes to these consequences, an em-
ployee decision to select the union, in response to the net positive value, may
be deemed a rational choice.3 9 Of course an employee before voting for or
against a union does not create such a mathematical quagmire. But he does
attempt to predict the probable results of unionization and evaluate these re-
sults. This process, save for the numbers, is what is described in the above
chart.
There are three classes of employer statements that affect the employee's
evaluation of the above and other factors and thereby affect his ultimate de-
cision to accept or reject the union. One class of employer speech, ordinarily
termed coercive, clearly impedes a reasoned choice. The National Labor Re-
lations Act proscribes any employer action which is undertaken for the pur-
pose of deterring organizational and collective activities.40 Thus, for example,
a wage increase in appreciation of a rejection of a union would clearly be an
unfair labor practice.41 Since the employer cannot take these actions he cannot
discuss them during an organizational campaign, for such speech would lead
the employees to place a disutility on unionization that is not justified. Thus it
is "to be expected that such speech constitutes grounds for invalidating the elec-
tion as well as an unfair labor practice.4 Such threats or promises of employer
action should not be confused, however, with the employer's description of
events that are beyond his control. The indefiniteness of the line between
events within and beyond the employer's control is demonstrated by the
Board's difficulty in preventing the distinction between an unlawful threat or
38. For a careful discussion of the process of attaching utilities and probabilities to
events see LucE & RAIFFA, GAMEs AND DEcIsIoNs (1957), and DAVIDSON, SUPPES &
SIEGEL, DECISION MAKING: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH (1957).
39. For a lucid statement and comparative analysis of the many criteria, here simplified,
for determining which course of action conduces most appropriately to the desired end see
Lucy & RAiFFA, op. cit. mipra note 38, at ch. 13; also DAHL & LINDBLOM, op. cit. stipra note
35, at 57-92.
40. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1958).
41. Cf., e.g., Top Mode Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1275-76 (1952).
42. See, e.g., Franchester Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 1391 (1954).
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promise and a lawful prediction from becoming a semantic one.43 Nevertheless,
the distinction is a necessary one. Although an employer's speech is culpable
if employees may legitimately infer that the undesirable event is within the con-
trol of the employer," speech about the consequences of unionization that is
not within his control is permissible and indeed encouraged.4" Thus a statement
to his employees that he will hire Negroes "if the union is elected" is coercive,40
while a suggestion that the union will bring Negroes into the plant with it is
not.
47
The goal of a fully rational decision will be attained only if there is a maxi-
mum likelihood that the actor will know the facts that cast light on the alterna-
tives and consequences. A choice may thus be deemed more or less rational
depending on the extent and accuracy of the information which serves as the
foundation of the decision.48 If, for example, the employer misinforms the
workers as to the union's success in raising wages elsewhere, thus leading them
erroneously to conclude that their wages will remain the same, and thereby to
attribute a value of "0" to this component, their opportunity for a reasoned
choice is diminished.
Although the Act does not explicitly require accurate or full information,
the NLRB has recognized the importance of accurate information to a reasoned
decision. Thus, the Board has invalidated elections preceded by material mis-
statements of facts peculiarly within the speaker's knowledge.O Particularly
illustrative of the Board's treatment of misrepresentation in a racial context is
Heinzt Division, Kelsey Hayes Co.'0 in which one of the campaigning unions
43. Cf., Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discriminalion, 62
CoLumT. L. Rxv. 563, 576-78 (1962). The distinction between a threat or a promise and a
prediction was announced in Chicopee Mfg. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 106 (1953). Compare Mur-
ray Ohio Mfg. Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1959). The distinction has not been invoked by
the Kennedy Board.
44. Cf. Smith Rice Mill, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 959 (1950).
45. See notes 24-25 supra.
46. Petroleum Carrier Corp. of Tampa, 126 N.L.R.B. 1031 (1960).
47. Sharnay Hosiery Mills, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 750 (1958).
There was a time when any mention of the union's policy on race was regarded as an
unfair labor practice, but since 1949 such remarks, much as they have been deprecated, have
been allowed by the Board. Compare Edinburg Citrus Ass'n, 57 N.L.R.B. 1145 (1944)
("If the CIO comes in the Mexicans will soon have your job." Id. at 1156.), and Bibb Mfg.
Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 338 (1949) ("You can join the union if you want to work with Negroes."
Id. at 358.) with American Thread Co., 84 N.L.I.B. 593 (1949) ("You %ill work side by
side with Negroes sharing the same rest rooms. Id. at 601) and Happ Bros. Co., 90 N.L.R.B.
1513 (1950) ("... [D] on't you know if you all get the union up here you'll be sitting up here
by niggers?" Id. at 1533.).
48. See KCELEY, POCrrWc . CAMPAIGNING 10 (1960); Simox, op. cit. mspra note 35
at 75-76 ("objectively rational behavior"). But cf. Hempel, supra note 36, at 6.
49. See, e.g., United States Gypsum Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 901 (1961). See also 25 NLRB
Axx. RFP. 52 (1960).
50. 126 N.L.R.B. 151 (1960). The fact that this misrepresentation of union race policy
occurred in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania indicates that the problem of an employer's use of
race propaganda is by no means restricted to the South.
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hired Negroes to distribute the literature of the competing union at an enm-
ployee baseball game. The Board, in invalidating the election of the union that
hired the Negroes, apparently recognized that one requirement of the custom-
ary misrepresentation rule-that the misstatement be of facts within the speak-
er's peculiar knowledge-was inappropriate for misrepresentations of racial
policy.5 1 Even though the misrepresented policy is not within the special knowl-
edge of the employer or competing unions (certainly a union knows what its
racial policy actually is), the union's ability to persuade the employees of the
truth, and thus to alter the change in utilities attributable to the misrepresenta-
tion, cannot be relied upon.5 2 Where a subsequent clarification is not likely to
dissipate quickly the effects of such misrepresentation, invalidation of the elec-
tion and perhaps a bar to a new election for a stipulated period of time are
appropriate, albeit not wholly effective, measures for ensuring a rational choice.
There are two ways in which the employer without resorting to "coercive"
or untrue statements may lead his employees to reject the union. One would
be to inform the workers of consequences of unionization that they had been
unaware of and upon which they place a negative value. For example, the
employees may have previously forecast three consequences of a pro-integra-
tion union, each having a utility of-20, and the employer informs them of two
other consequences, which leads them to place a total utility of-100 on this
component.53 Although it may decisively affect the employee's decision, this
statement of a possible consequence of unionism cannot be deemed a coercivt.
threat or promise, since it describes a matter that is not within the employer's
control. Indeed knowledge of the consequences of organization increases the
employees' opportunity for rational choice.5 4 The second way would be to
argue about the values the employees should assign, either explicitly or by
stating the consequences in value laden terms. An environment conducive to a
fully rational choice would be one in which the employees not only had full and
accurate information but also an opportunity to hear full argument about
values and to weigh such arguments calmly and carefully.55
There are certain appeals which stimulate the emotional processes in such a
way as to make dispassionate deliberation impossible or at least unlikely. If
these appeals could be identified and isolated, the appropriate remedy to ensure
an opportunity for rational choice would be to prohibit such speech. The diffi-
51. Id. at 153. See also 25 NLRB ANN. REP. 52 (1960).
52. The difficulties in reaching biased individuals with "the facts" on racial matters is
indicated in Cooper & Jahoda, The Evasion of Propaganda, How Prejudiced People Re-
spond to Anti-Prejudice Propaganda, in KATZ, CARTWRIGHT ET AL,, PUBLIC OPINION
AND PROPAGANDA 313 (1954). See also Katz, Psychological Barriers to Coimnuideation,
in SCHRAMM, MASS COMMUNICATIONS 275 (1949). But cf. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF PSYCHIATRY, EMOTIONAL AsPEcTs OF ScHOOL DESEGREGATION 20-37 (1960) (hereinafter
cited as GAP). (It is possible, though difficult, for the attitudes of biased people to be
changed.)
53. See model in text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
54. Se conception of rationality in text accompanying note 49 supra.
55. See the suggestive remarks of OPPENHEim, DIMENSIONS OF FREEDOM 17-18 (1961).
See also SIMON, op. cit. supra, note 35 at 75-76 ("deliberately rational behavior").
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culty, beyond the fact that the employer has a right to speech and the employees,
quite like voters in political elections, are free to choose on emotional grounds,
is that argument about some issues, regardless of the manner of presentation,
evokes emotional responses.56 However valid the common sense distinction be-
tween a rational appeal and an emotional appeal, between "a calm, orderly,
restrained presentation" and "a complex fusion of excitement, resentment,
vague enthusiasm, strangely aroused fears and hopes,"r 7 it cannot be applied
to issues where, owing to the nature of the issue itself, the predictable
response of any appeal is primarily emotional. Racial attitudes, especially in
the South, are held with a fervor quite like religious and political convictions.Ii
While such attitudes may also be founded upon sustained value preferences,"0
the fundamental difficulty in applying a common sense distinction between
emotional and rational appeals in this area is that no criteria have been de-
rived for ascertaining the nature and form of propaganda which activates emo-
tional rather than rational processes on emotionally charged issues.0e Most
appeals to race in the South are likely to call forth a response far more intense
and less rational than appeals to wages, hours, and conditions of employment.
Moreover, such factors as the social environment, the changes taking place in
that environment, and the fervor with which racial attitudes are held are
likely to be far more operative factors in determining the nature of the response
to arguments about the question than the language or manner in which the
argument is presented.61 Thus, for example, it is difficult to conceive of any
calm and orderly presentation of argument that would have evoked a primarily
rational response from many persons in Mississippi to the issue of Meredith's
admission to the University, at least once the issue had become a glowing con-
56. HOVLAND, JANIS & KELLEY, Com'EUNICATIoN AND PERSUASION 57-60 (1953).
According to Freudian theory emotions are involved in all decision processes. The dis-
tinction between rational and irrational processes is not grounded on the presence or
absence of emotion but rather on the sort of emotion that is present. The rational pro-
cesses are characterized by emotional drive relatively bound in structures of a highly social-
ized nature and discharged in a reflective, controlled fashion. The irrational processes involve
emotional drives striving toward immediate release. Schafer, Regression in the Serice of
the Ego: the Relevance of a Psychoanalytic Concept for Personality Assessmaent, in LIND-
zEY, AssEssxMNr OF HumAN Morvzs 119, 123-25 (1958). The suggestion here is not
that no distinction can ever be drawn between the rational and irrational treatment of issues.
Indeed there are some issues, e.g., wages and hours of employment, that we are used to hav-
ing discussed on a rational level and irrational appeals on such issues might well be recog-
nizable. The difficulty arises when the issue is such a stormy one as race. Here the at-
tempted distinction does not appear workable.
57. Hartmann, The Comparative Effectiveness of 'Emotional' and 'Rational' Political
Leaflets, 31 J. ABNomm. Soc. PsYcHo- 31 (1936).
58. Cf. GAP, op. cit. supra note 53, at 10-20.
59. Cf. GAP, op. cit. supra note 53, at 9-10, 20.
60. HOVLAND, JANIS & KELLEY, op. cit. supra note 57, at 58-59. See generally LAss-
WELL & LEras, THE LANGUAGE OF PoLrrcs (1949) and BERELSOX, CONTENT ANALYSIS
ix CommU ,ucATioN RFSEARcH (1951).
61. See authorities cited at note 52 supra.
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troversy. On the other hand, a demogogic appeal to persons in that state who
were differently disposed to the issue would probably not significantly alter the
nature of their response.
0 2
Sewell and Allen-Morrison represent the Board's maiden voyage into the
emotional nature and effect of campaign propaganda. In Sewell the Board be-
lieved that it had identified and isolated "inflammatory" race propaganda and
thus invalidated the election;03 similarly, in Allen-Morrison the NLRB be-
lieved it had discovered the true nature of a factual, germane and temperate
presentation of the union's race policy and upheld the election.i The failure
of this excursion into a wonderland of prediction and surmise which appears
to lie beyond the Board's expertise is borne out by a closer examination of
these two cases. A comparison of the propaganda in Sewell with that in Allen-
Morrison demonstrates the unworkability of the common sense distinction be-
tween rational and irrational appeals as applied to such emotionally laden is-
sues as race.
The election in Sewell Mfg. Co. took place in two small towns in Georgia.0 ,1
During a campaign by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, the employer, two weeks before the election, sent each employee
a picture of an unidentified Negro man dancing with an unidentified white
lady, captioned "The CIO Strongly Pushes and Endorses the [Fair Employ-
ment Practices Commission] ." The employer also included a reprint of a simi-
lar picture which has been published in the Jackson, Mississippi Daily News,
captioned "Union Leader James B. Carey Dances with a Lady Friend."00
Later the employer sent a letter calling attention to the union's support of the
NAACP and CORE. For four months prior to the election, Militant Truth,
a four-page monthly anti-union racist newspaper 67 carrying articles on "race
mixing" and "radical labor union organizers" was included in the literature
sent to the employees by the employer.
The election in Allen-Morrison took place in Lynchburg, Virginia. 8 It was
preceded by an employer campaign which included a mailing eight days before
the election of a five-and-a-half page letter, one page of which discussed the
union's position on the race question. The employer there quoted from the text
of the AFL-CIO brief in Brown v. Board of Education where the federation
wrote that it "supports the elimination of racial segregation from every phase
62. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1962, p. 22, cols. 6-8. And compare N.Y. Times, Oct. 1,
1962, p. 23, col. 5 with N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1962, p. 24, col. 4.
63. Sewell Mfg. Co., 50 L.R.R.M. at 1535.
64. Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 50 L.R.R.M. at 1536-37.
65. Sewell Mfg. Co., 50 L.R.R.M. at 1532.
66. This picture of James Carey, secretary-treasurer of AFL-CIO, dancing with a
Nigerian delegate at an International Labor Organization Conference in Geneva has been
given wide circulation whenever his union seeks to organize in the South. H. R. REP. No,
75142, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1961).
67. Miltilant Truth is the same periodical circulated in Blue Ridge Shirt Mfg. Co., 70
N.L.R.B.,741, 756 (1946).
68. N.L.R.B. Decides Two Cases Dealing with Racial Propaganda, NLRB Press Re-
lease, Washington, No. R-882, August 10, 1962.
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of American Life... forthwith" and that where "unions have their way, there
is likewise no segregation in the use of plant eating places, locker rooms,
restrooms, etc." The employer also noted a $75,000 AFL-CIO contribution to
the NAACP "which is the organization working to wipe out all racial segre-
gation, both in schools, manufacturing plants and elsewhere." The employer
stated: "Whether you believe in segregation or integration of white and colored
schools, swimming pools, plants and other places is a question for you to de-
cide.... The Company considers this a matter for each individual to decide.
The national unions on the other hand ... have tried to force [integration]
down the throats of people living in the South. GO A one column reprint from
Militant Truth, sent two days before the election, reported that the national
union had taken over direction of the affairs of a near-by local because the
local had voted to buy bonds to help finance a segregated school.
The Board concluded from the evidence in Scell that the employer pre-
vented a "reasoned" choice by deliberately seeking "to exacerbate racial prej-
udice and to create an emotional atmosphere of hostility to the [union]."7 °
It found in Allen-Morrison, however, that the employer had not resorted to in-
flammatory appeals and therefore had not impaired the employee's reasoned
choice.71 But if the offensive factor in such campaigns is an appeal that tends
to reduce the likelihood of a reasoned or a rational choice, there seems little
to distinguish the propaganda in Allen-Morrison from that in Sewell.2
Compare, for example, the personalized nature of the propaganda in Allei-
Morrison with the relatively impersonal propaganda in Seowell. It is well
established that content factors which augment the meaningfulness of the
propaganda by elaborating on its consequences and by emphasizing its ap-
plicability to the audience tend to heighten the intensity of emotional re-
sponse.7 3 The relatively minimal discussion of the racial issue in Allen-M or-
rison did not necessarily make it less effective than the full-blown inflamma-
tory propaganda in Sewell. Indeed there is evidence that a strongly phrased
or blatant appeal will tend to be less effective than a more temperate presenta-
tion.74 Therefore, it seems difficult rationally to conclude that an atmosphere
less conducive to a reasoned choice was created in Sewell than in Allen-Mfor-
rison; if it be judged by its likely effect, the propaganda was as "temperate" or
"inflammatory" in one as in the other.
69. Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 50 L.RR.M. at 1536.
70. Sewell Mfg. Co., 50 L.R.RM. at 1535.
71. Allen-Mforrison Sign Co., 50 L.R.RM. at 1536.
72. In neither Sewell nor Allen-Morrison did the Board find that the employer's
propaganda misrepresented the union's racial policy and the cases therefore cannot be
distinguished on those grounds. Neither can they be distinguished by the fact that one
election was in Georgia and the other in Virginia. It is doubtful that racial attitudes in
Lynchburg are so certainly and significantly different from those in Bremen and Temple to
support a judgment that the employer's propaganda there was any less or more inflammatory.
Cf. "Atstice in Virginia," The New Republic, March 2, 1963, p. 5 (an editorial account
of jury treatment of Negroes in Lynchburg).
73. HOVLAND, JANS & KELLEY, op. cit. supra note 57, at 72.
74. Id. at 80-82.
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Given the present state of knowledge about emotional and rational appeals,
as well as the numerous variables that the Board does not seem competent to
assess, the result of applying the Board's new found distinction in any par-
ticular case would seem to be based on speculation. More candidly, the re-
sults are likely to turn on such "emotional" factors as the trial examiners'
or Board's feelings toward the statements made by an employer during a
representation campaign." This, however, is not to say that some employer
arguments on the subject of race do not impair the likelihood of a reasoned
choice, but that a distinction between these arguments and others which ap-
peal to deeply held value prefei'ences is not workable. It would follow, then,
that the only way to eliminate the first category of arguments is to regard all
racial appeals as inflammatory and to prohibit all discussion on the subject.
But such an approach would deny employees an adequate opportunity to con-
sider the issue of race in deciding to accept or reject the union. Indeed it
would be tantamount to asserting that racial prejudice was an improper rea-
son for rejecting a union. Such an assertion, desirable as it may be, seems in-
consistent with the proper role of an administrative agency and more specifical-
ly with the statutory obligations of the Board.
By relying on a distinction between rational and irrational appeals to the
racial issue, which the Board does not view as unworkable, the NLRB has
avoided recognition of the inconsistency between its position in cases involving
race propaganda and its fundamental objective of encouraging unfettered em-
ployee choice. The Board's duty under sections 7 70 and 9(c) 77 is to determine
the desires of the employees on the question of union representation; it is no-
where authorized to decree that some employee desires are to be registered and
respected and others not. To refuse to recognize the employees' selection re-
quires an assumption that the employees have the freedom to make certain
choices and not others. This is not the sort of freedom of choice we are used to
thinking of as guaranteed by our institutions.7" The freedom of employee choice
which the Board has sought to preserve in representation cases generally is not
the "positive freedom"70 to choose only those ends the Board or some other in-
stitution deems "rational."80
75. Compare, e.g., the trial examiner's report in Neco Elec. Prod. Corp., 124 N.L.R.B.
481, 485 (1959), with the trial examiner's report in Petroleum Carrier Corp. of Tampa,
126 N.L.R.B. 1031, 1038 (1960).
76. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations . . . and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities...." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
77. "[The Board] shall direct an election by iecret ballot and shall certify the results
thereof." 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (B) (1958).
78. See generally BERLIN, Two CoNczrrs OF LiBRTY (1958) in which the author
argues that the sort of freedom central to liberal democratic society is the freedom, not
to make certain approved choices, but to make any choice. Surely this sort of freedom Is
crucial to the proper functioning of an election process, for the very point of the election
process is to direct our institutions according to the wishes of the people.
79. This is Isaiah Berlin's phrase.
80. The concept of rationality is conventionally used, as it is in this Note, to character-
ize some aspect of the coincidence of means to ends. There are some, however, who have
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If a policy of furthering racial integration could be found in the NLRA or
other legislative commands, a rule forbidding mention of race in organizational
campaigns might be justified. At the least, the existence of such a policy would
require evaluation of such a rule in the context of other statutory policies.
Neither the statute nor the Constitution, however, charges the Board with
the duty of encouraging racial integration. Constitutional commands forbid
governmental discrimination on the basis of race; they in no way require affirm-
ative governmental action to integrate the races. While the Board as an agency
of government has the primary duty of conforming to constitutional com-
mands, respecting the choice of employees who reject a pro-integration union
is far from the affirmative official conduct necessary to sustain a finding of
governmental action which denies equal protection.8 ' It might be argued, how-
ever, that the recent Board decisions revoking the certification of unions that
exclude Negroes from membership in the craft or bargaining unit which they
represent 8 2 evidence a statutory policy of furthering racial integration. The
theory underlying these decisions is that a union has a duty to represent fairly
all members of a bargaining unit and that persons excluded from union mem-
bership for arbitrary reasons cannot be fairly represented by the unionY8
suggested that "rationality" might well be used to characterize the ends themselves. Kaplan,
for example, in remarks at the 1962 meeting of the American Society of Legal and Political
Philosophy (see note 35 supra) suggested that rationality involves not only acting so as
to achieve the values pursued, but also judging that the ends themselves are worth pursuing.
Nagel, at the same meeting, suggested that it is appropriate to talk about rationality of
ends, to ask, e.g., whether the choice of ends is warranted. If rationality requires the evalu-
ation of ends, the difficult question, as Kaplan pointed out, is: where do we get the insight
to value ends-how do we judge them without a comprehensive political philosophy. The
discussion of rationality of ends leads once more back to Berlin's concept of positive liberty.
Berlin sees as central to freedom that no institution should have the power or the authority
to formulate and effectuate a comprehensive political philosophy but rather that the in-
dividual should be protected in choosing and gaining whatever ends he wishes. No one is
to tell the individual (except for argument's sake) that his choice of goals is irrational, and
certainly no one is to tell the individual his choice is beyond the pale, except of course where
the individual's choice is competing with the choice of another individual and some ad-
justment is necessary. This theory seems exemplified in democratic elections where an
individual may vote as he chooses for whatever reason he chooses (except of course to
secure a bribe) whether or not the choice be "warranted" or "worth making" from the view-
point of some comprehensive political philosophy. See supra note 78.
81. Compare Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). (The parties to the restrictive
covenant could not have accomplished their purposes if the state had not ordered compliance
with their agreement).
Where ... the parties could have achieved their purposes without the federal en-
actment.., the federal statute ... does no more than declare that the federal govern-
ment will "tolerate" the [private activity] .... And governmental toleration will not
sustain a finding of governmental action.
Wellington, The Constitution, The Labor Union, and "Governmental Action," 70 YAu L.J.
345,356 (1961).
82. Hughes Tool Co., Trial Examiner's Report IR-93-63, February 28, 1963. Cf.,
Pioneer Bus Co., 51 L.R.R.M. 1546 (1962).
83. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) ; Syres v. Oil W'orkers, 350
U.S. 892 (1955). See, e.g., Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Vii.. L. REv. 151
(1957).
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Although this extension of the fair representation doctrine has been exclusive-
ly applied to membership exclusion on the basis of race, there is nothing in its
rationale to so limit its applicability. Rather it would appear to apply to ex-
clusion of workers on any grounds other than a failure to pay dues or perhaps
to comply with legitimate union rules. Thus the rationale of the above de-
certification cases based upon the statutory duty of fair representation does not
indicate that the NLRA imposes an obligation to integrate labor unions. As
with most governmental requirements regarding race or other arbitrary classi-
fications, the rationale embodies a negative command not to discriminate.8 4
And the distinction between a duty to integrate and a duty not to discriminate,
i.e., not to use race as a criterion for action, is by no means a semantic one.88
Indeed the validity of legislation which requires integration, benign quotas, is
not free from doubt.8 6 Thus it requires a leap of feeling, not an inference from
reason, to find a policy of promoting racial integration in the NLRA.
Notwithstanding the absence of a constitutional or statutory duty to further
racial integration, to what extent may a governmental agency properly seek
to advance racial equality along with its other objectives? In terms of democra-
tic theory, it is doubtful that governmental agencies, in the absence of statu-
tory directive requiring or encouraging racial integration, may legitimately
pursue this value. Where the validity of this statutory directive, even if one
could be found, would be problematical, such a pursuit seems more than doubt-
ful. Moreover, any promotion of racial integration by the Board necessarily in-
volves a cost in terms of other values-those embodied in the specific legisla-
tion which the agency is charged with enforcing (freedom of choice) and those
rooted in historic cultural experience (freedom of speech and association).
Basic principles of representative government dictate that the official resolu-
tion of such major value conflicts does not reside in administrative agencies, 7
REMEDIES IN REPRESENTATION CAMPAIGNS
The discussion of the Board's approach to racial propaganda suggests not
only that its efforts there are ill-conceived but that they are misdirected. If
the Board has been perhaps overzealous with regard to race propaganda, it has
not been nearly so zealous as it might be in the matter of ensuring rational
choice in representation proceedings generally. Even now many appeals to
race and other emotionally charged appeals that impair a reasoned choice are
permissible. To the extent that ignoring the manner of presentation of the
racial issue would further undermine the employees' opportunity for a rational
choice, the need for addressing the major question of rationality in representa-
tion elections is underscored. The remedies employed to date for misrepresen-
84. Cf. Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the
Laws," 50 CoLtum. L. REv. 131, 167-68 (1950); Tussman & ten Broek, The Equal Pro-
tection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 357 (1949).
85. Coffin, Desegregation: Will It Work?, Saturday Review, Nov. 11, 1961, 1). 20,
86. Cf. Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222, 230-31 (7th Cir. 1961).
87. See HART & SAcHs, TnE LEGAL PROCESS 183, 187-88 (Mimeo. 1958).
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tation, for lack of opportunity for deliberation, and perhaps for employer coer-
cion are inadequate to ensure a reasoned choice.
The Board's remedial powers are strongest where it finds the employer's
conduct to be coercive. In such cases the Board can issue a cease and desist order
as well as an order for a new election.8s The more usual remedy in representa-
tion cases is the invalidation of the election and the ordering of a new election.
The Board's authority to issue a cease and desist order against employer
speech is restricted by Section 8(c), which provides that employer speech
may not constitute, or be used as evidence of, an unfair labor practice unless it
amounts to a threat or promise.8 9 The legislative history of 8(c) indicates that
it was designed to guarantee the employer's right of speech, md to ensure that
his speech would not be subject to the unfair labor practice remedy of a
cease and desist order.90 The Board has been able to hold that 8(c) imposes
no limitation on the sort of conduct that is relevant to representation proceed-
ings precisely because it does not apply the unfair labor practice remedy in that
area.9 ' In cases of misrepresentation the cease and desist order has consistently
been omitted from the order for a new election and no retraction has been re-
quired.9 2 The same limitation applies to the remedies invoked to preserve the
employees' opportunity for deliberation. In this area the Board has promul-
gated a series of rules forbidding campaigning at the polls, 93 and speeches on
company time within twenty-four hours of the election.9 4 The only sanction
for a violation of these rules is a new election. The offensive language is not
of course expunged from the employees' minds and, except for coercive
speech, may be repeated by the employer. 3 Moreover, present remedies neither
prevent an atmosphere of confusion, misinformation, and inflammation from
developing at the subsequent election campaign, nor increase the extent of the
information and argumentation, or the opportunity for deliberation available
to employees, except as the passage of time and new efforts by the parties
chance to further these objectives.9"
Since an injunction against misrepresentation and other noncoercive speech
is prohibited and a new election order is inadequate to ensure a reasoned
choice, it would seem that the most desirable remedy, consistent with an ap-
propriate role for the Board, is one designed to increase rather than decrease
speech, insuring an opportunity for full and accurate information, full argu-
ment, and deliberation in the electoral process.
88. See, e.g., General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 128-29 (1948).
89. 61 Stat. 140 (1947),29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1958).
90. See authorities cited at note 26 supra.
91. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 935, 938-39 (1950).
92. See, e.g., United Aircraft Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 102, 107 (1953).
93. See, e.g., Higgins, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 845 (1953).
94. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427,429 (1953).
95. See note 92 supra. (Note the absence of a cease and desist order.)
96. The N.L.R.B. might order that its opinion be posted. By thus informing the em-
ployees of the reason for the new election the confusion, misinformation and inflammation,
in part, might be dissipated.
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The significance of open and full discussion in representative campaigns, as
in all political campaigns, lies in the fact that it forms the essential basis for a
reasoned choice. 7 Structuring the presentation of views into the form of a
debate should enhance the contribution of discussion to such a choice.08 In a
debating situation two parties advocating alternative courses of action enjoy
equal access to an identical audience and equal ability to communicate their
arguments to that audience. Each asks the audience to favor one of the two
proposals, stating the reasons that support the choice of the alternative he
recommends. Each seeks to demonstrate that his proposal accords with the
principles, goals, and interests of the audience. The debater is under some
compulsion to challenge those of his opponent's arguments that express aims
or assumptions differing from his own and must answer similar challenges
from his opponent. If he does not, he risks suggesting to the audience that his
opponent's arguments cannot be met or that his own cannot be defended, if
he responds with obvious evasions, the audience may conclude that his case
is too weak to be frankly discussed. Moreover, the debating situation contains
certain checks on the accuracy of the information presented. A party who
distorts the facts risks exposure, for he gives strong incentive to his opponent
to point out the distortion.
Given the benefits of confrontation and joinder of issues, the principle ob-
jective of the Board in representation campaigns should be to assure equal and
maximum union-management access to the employees. Although the decision
has not been so read by commentatQrs or the Board, the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. United Steelworkers 09 seems to have endorsed this view of the
Board's role. Implying that per se rules regarding access might not be ap-
propriate, it found that the essential factor in organizational campaigns was a
balance between the opportunities of union and management to present their
views to employees.10° Thus the Court indicated that the Board was to ex-
amine the available channels of communication in order to determine whether
the facilities and resources available to the union for effectively reaching the
employees with a pro-union message are as great as the employer's for pro-
moting his views.' 0 ' This decision might be criticized as leaving the Board
without standards for making the determination whether a balance or im-
balance exists.'0 2 But the Court's decision on the evils of per se rules does not
preclude the Board from establishing guidelines through the use of pre-
sumptions of imbalance in certain circumstances. 0 3 Indeed, to the extent
that such guidelines and presumptions insure an unimpeded flow of itifornia-
tion to the employees from both the union and management, they would ap-
pear to follow from the Court's views in United Steelworkers.
97. See MILL, oN LIBERTY (1859).
98. See KELLEY, op. cit. supra note 48 at 16-25.
99. 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
100. Id. at 363.
101. Id. at 364.
102. Cf. 357 U.S. at 364. See Note, 57 MIcH. L. REV. 615, 618 (1959).
103. See text at note 108 infra.
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Resurrection of the presumption of imbalance embodied in the now dis-
carded Bonwit Teller doctrine 104 would go a long way toward ensuring equal
access to the union and maximum discussion to employees. Apparently recog-
nizing the relationship between a full presentation of issues by both sides and a
reasoned choice, the Board in Bonwit Teller held that an employer committed
an unfair labor practice when he addressed his employees during paid com-
pany time on his premises without affording the union an opportunity to ad-
dress the employees in identical circumstances. 105 A substantial part of the
Bonwit Teller doctrine was short-lived, however, for two years later the Board
in Livingston Shirt Co. held that in the absence of either an unlawful broad no-
solicitation rule or a privileged no-solicitation rule an employer may, not-
withstanding his own pre-election speeches, deny the union the right to ad-
dress the employees on his premises during company time.100 Among the rea-
sons for discarding the Bonwit Teller doctrine was the purported per se quality
of a rule requiring an employer to open his premises to the union upon using
these premises to address his employees in an organizational campaign.0 7 But
a fair reading of the Bonwit Teller doctrine, or in any case the above proposal,
would create a presumption of imbalance where the employer has used his
premises on company time for an anti-union speech. A refusal to allow the
union a similar opportunity would not be an unfair labor practice if the em-
ployer shows that other channels of communication available to the union were
equally effective in presenting the union's views to the employees. This pre-
sumption, rebuttable in circumstances where there is equal opportunity for
communication, would not seem to offend the Court's objections in United
Steelworkers to per se rules. 0 s Indeed, to the extent that it ensures an intel-
ligible means of determining whether the opportunities for communication are
balanced, it would seem to follow from the Court's views in that decision.1n3
It is true that an employer might rarely be able to make the showing necessary
to rebut the presumption, since alternative effective means of communication
will probably not often be available. But this is merely to say that the justifica-
tion for the presumption will be present in most cases. If a case by case balanc-
ing process without benefit of the presumption would lead to the same result-
a finding of insufficient alternatives and thus an unfair labor practice-to re-
ject a presumption which provides an intelligible guide to employer conduct
104. 96 N.L.R-B. 608 (1951), enforcement den. on other grounds and order remanded,
197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953), modified 104 N.LR.B. 497
(1953).
105. 96 N.L.R.B. at 612. The Bonwit Teller holding was stated narrowly: the union
must be accorded opportunity to reply on company time and premises where "circumstances
are such that only by granting a request [by the union for equal time] will the employees
have a reasonable opportunity to hear both sides." Ibid. The rule wvas applied, however,
without much regard to the circumstances. See the cases collected in Livingstone Shirt Corp.,
107 N.L.R.B. 400, at 405 n.12 (1953).
106. 107 N.L.R.B. at 409.
107. Id. at 405.
108. In fact the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers referred to the Bonwit Teller
rule with seeming approval. 357 U.S. at 364.
109. Cf. 357 U.S. at 364.
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and which contributes to administrative efficiency would be to sacrifice these
benefits for some abstract attachment to unstructured ad hoc balancing.
The other objections found in Livingston Shirt to the Bonwit Teller doc-
trine, based on the employer's speech and property rights,"10 are considerably
more persuasive and are equally applicable to a presumption as to a per se rule.
The extent to which requiring the employer to open his premises on paid com-
pany time for union organizers to address his employees imposes a burden on
the employer's property rights should not be underestimated. Because this bur-
den is substantial, it is also true that this requirement attaches a fairly weighty
condition to the employer's freedom to address his employees. It is no answer
to say that the employer need not address his employees, since that would hard-
ly be consistent with the objective of maximizing discussion. Previous resolu-
tions of these questions have beclouded the competing considerations by a no-
tion that the employer invites the obligation of offering his premises and com-
pany time to the union by addressing his employees in such circumstances and
that the requirement therefore is justified by his own voluntary action."1 ' If
this were the justification of the Bonwit Teller doctrine, its curtailment in
Livingston Shirt seems unquestionable.
The justification for the doctrine is, however, far more persuasive. Perhaps
the best statement of the considerations supporting the Bonwit Teller rule
can be found in a recent decision of the Board holding that denial to the union
of access on company time and premises where the employer had a broad but
privileged no-solicitation rule constituted an unfair labor practice and cause for
a new election.112
Respondent seized for itself the most advantageous circumstances in
which to present to employees its side of the organizational question. It
spoke to them in massed assemblies during working time, thus gaining
the not inconsiderable benefit flowing from the utilization of the employ-
ment relationship for such purposes, and ensuring that its message would
reach all of its employees in the most carefully thought out and coherent
form for maximum effectiveness. At the same time it relegated the union
and its employee supporters to relatively catch-as-catch-can methods of
rebuttal, such as home visits, advertised meetings on the employees' own
time, telephone calls, letters, and the various mass media of communica-
tion....
The place of work is the one place where all employees involved are
sure to be together. Thus it is the one place where they can all discuss
with each other the advantages and disadvantages of organization, and
lend each other support and encouragement. Such full discussion lies at
the very heart of the organizational rights guaranteed by the Act .... It
is only where opportunities for such discussion are available, limited, of
course, by the need to maintain production, order and discipline, that the
110. 107 N.L.R.B. at 405-07.
111. See, e.g., Bonwit Teller, 96 N.L.R.B. at 614-15; Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.
R.B. at 406-07.
112. May Department Stores, 136 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1962), 49 L.R.R.M. 1862.
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election procedures established in the Act can be expected to produce
the peaceful resolution of representation questions on the basis of a free
and informed choice."13
The "catch-as-catch-can" forms of access available to the union which the
Board found inadequate in May Department Stores are probably all a union
will have in most organizational campaigns."14 Where such an imbalance exists,
the only alternative to the requirements of the Bonwit Teller presumption
is to allow a highly effective one sided presentation of views to the employees.
Such a situation does not seem to comport with the statutory policy guarantee-
ing employees a reasoned choice, regardless of whether the statute is or is not
neutral to collective bargaining. Because of the fundamental importance of this
statutory policy and because of the mandate of the Supreme Court to the
Board to ensure equal access, the Board would seem justified in resolving this
conflict in favor of resurrecting the Bonwit Teller doctrine."0
More directly related to the benefits of debate in ensuring a reasoned choice
would be a procedure attempting to guarantee that the employees receive both
employer and union views on the issue of organization. The Bonwit Teller
doctrine, even if resurrected, does not assure a full presentation of views, for
the employer must first address the employees in certain circumstances before
it comes into operation. If Bon-wit Teller is not reinstated, the need for another
effective media of communication is accentuated. The procedure suggested here,
which may be termed the Oregon pamphlet plan, is based upon that state's prac-
tice of mailing to all voters at a specified time before each election state sub-
sidized pamphlets setting forth the arguments supporting and opposing candi-
dates and referendum proposals." 6 The arguments are published as submitted
by party committees, independent candidates, individuals filing initiative peti-
tions, and any person opposing candidacies or referendum measures. Studies of
113. 49. L.R.R.M. at 1864. The opinion says further:
Where such discussion is not allowed, the normal channels of communication become
clogged and lose their effectiveness.... The balance in 'opportunities for organiza-
tional communication' is destroyed by an employer's utilization of working time and
place for its antiunion campaign.... Only by [acceding to the Union's request to
address the employees under similar circumstances] could the [employer] maintain
the balance which the Supreme Court deemed so important a factor in this area.
Id. at 1864-65.
114. For a thorough analysis of the forms of access available to unions and management
and their effectiveness see Note, Union Right of Reply to Employer On-the-Job Spccches:
The NLRB Takes A New Approach, 61 YA.. L.J. 1066, 107478 (1952).
115. This choice among competing values seems well within the competence and
authority of the Board, involving as it does those considerations of labor-management rela-
tions which are its statutory charge-and, indeed, considerations which the Supreme Court
has ordered in such a way as to suggest just this resolution.
116. 23 Ore. R. Stat. 255 (1961). The pamphlet is used in California to inform voters
about ballot measures, 29 CAl. ELc. CODE §§ 3567-74 (1961), and in North Dakota to in-
form voters about ballot measures and candidates, 3 N. DAF. CODE AmN., tit. 16, ch. 16-19
(1960). The discussion here of voter pamphlets is considerably indebted to Kyuw, op. cit.
supra note 48, at 41.
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the pamphlet's effectiveness indicate that it "is often the most widely read pub-
lication of the campaign""17-- "no other document ... plays ... such an im-
portant role in . . . 'the decision-making process.' "118 The pamphlet's official
character and the fact that the voter can see in juxtaposition the presentations
of both sides give it a special claim to the voter's attention.
This method of communication could be applied to organizational campaigns
without serious difficulty. Shortly after the first week following a Board order
for a representation election," 0 the Regional Director of the NLRB would
mail to the employees a pamphlet presenting the arguments for and against
organization-arguments written by the parties and subject to no editing or
revision by the Regional Director.12 0 Similarly, on the day before the election,
the Regional Director would distribute another pamphlet, 121 prepared in the
same way except that before the statements are published each party will have
an opportunity to see the other's and incorporate rebuttal in his own. As op-
posed to political campaigns where the wealth of the candidates is often grossly
unequal, 22 it is appropriate in representation campaigns that the full cost
of the publication and its distribution be borne by the parties.1 2  In order
to insure maximum opportunity for deliberation the Peerless Plywood rule,
which prohibits speeches during working hours within 24 hours of the elec-
tion,'2 4 should be extended to bar any campaign activity after the distribution
of the second pamphlet. Extending Peerless Plywood would vest the pub-
lication with even more considerable influence, for it would be the last and
freshest communication in the hands of the employee, the likely focus of the
final moments of his decision. The employer and union will, of course, be free
to campaign at any time other than after the distribution of the second pam-
phlet and in whatever other manner they choose.
117. See KELLEY, op. cit. supra note 48, at 41.
118. Id. at 42. In his discussion of the effectiveness of the pamphlet Kelley cites this
explanation: "The key reason ... or [its] effectiveness ... is that it affords the voter an
opportunity to study both sides of the case, presented simultaneously in the same document,
under official auspices." Id. at 42 n.29.
119. The customary order for an election directs that it be held within thirty days, 26
NLRB ANN. REP. 69 (1961).
120. This is the practice in California and North Dakota. See supra note 116. This
procedure is quite as appropriate here for reasons of convenience as well as for the sub-
stantial reason that there should be no censor in election campaigns. See supra note 78. The
usual remedies will be available if the pamphlet is used for coercive statements or for
egregious misrepresentation.
121. The second pamphlet might well be distributed by the Board agents who are prcent
at the election. 26 NLRB ANN. REP. 71 (1961).
122. Candidates in Oregon pay a statutory sum that amounts to one-third of the cost;
the state pays the other two-thirds. KELLEY, op. cit. supra note 48 at 37.
123. This is not to say that the parties to a representation election are equally wealthy
but only that each is likely to be above the financial threshold necessary to support the
cost of such a publication.
124. 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
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EMPLOYEE CHOICE
The obligation of the Board to ensure that the employees make their choice
under "conditions as nearly ideal as possible"' 5 -the core of the statutory
policy-and the Supreme Court's solicitude in United Steelworkers for a
balance of opportunities for organizational communication 'G would seem to
provide ample authority for establishing this procedure. Failure by either party
to comply should result in a presumption that the conditions surrounding the
election were not conducive to a reasoned choice. And the failure of a party to
publish or to rebut the presumption should result, upon a motion of the other
party, in an order invalidating the election. To a non-publishing but victorious
employer the consequences of such invalidation are not only the increased pos-
sibility of another organizational campaign by the defeated union or by another
union, but also a loss of the employer's right to be free from organizational
picketing for a year and from other picketing with whatever secondary effects
may accompany it. To a non-publishing but victorious union invalidation means
another organizational effort. Since these risks will most often exceed the cost
to the parties of publishing, the sanction of invalidation, albeit a limited one,
may be expected to work compliance with the rule.
Both the pamphlet procedure and the Bonwit Teller rule seem particular-
ly effective in assuaging the problem of the race issue, for they enable the
union to reach the employees, responding to the employer's statements in se,
or elaborating the various benefits of union organization in as vivid detail as
the employer portrayed the alleged racial consequences. These procedures
mitigate the effect of misrepresentation and distortion; the opportunity for
immediate and direct challenge makes such efforts risky and minimizes the
chance of their being believed. r7 It may well be that the studies indicating that
biased persons shut out anti-prejudice propaganda, that they actually fail to
see or to hear such propaganda,'m are applicable here and that such phenomena
will hinder the persuasive efforts of the unions. Nevertheless, if the statutory
guarantees of employee choice are to have force,m o and if the union's racial
policies are relevant to employee values,130 it is not appropriate that the dis-
cussion of the union's policy on racial integration should be entirely removed
from the election ;131 rather the discussion should be an open and adversary
one.
The presumptions suggested here seem dearly warranted by the objective of
securing for the employees an opportunity to make a deliberate choice in the
presence of full and accurate information and argument. They lend some form
to the process of balancing the opportunities for organizational communication,
125. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 at 127 (1948).
126. 357 U.S. at 364.
127. See text following note 98 mipra.
128. See authorities cited at note 52 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 75-87 .upra.
130. Ibid.
131. Indeed, even if the parties were prevented from raising the issue, it would likely be
present in employee discussion.
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providing both administrative convenience and predictable standards for union
and employer conduct. Although irrational and undesirable factors will continue
to influence employee choice, the very best that can be done, so long as the
objective is a free and reasoned choice, and not a determined one, is to ensure
that the discussion is fully informed and that the decision which follows is rea-
sonably deliberative.
